Summary Description of the WAVR-21 V3 with Some Threat Assessment Guidelines 

Stephen G. White, Ph.D., & J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D., ABPP
Co-developers of the WAVR-21

Workplace violence, including campus violence, remains a recurrent issue for employers and administrators charged with keeping the members of their work and learning communities safe. As an evidence-based structured professional judgment guide, or “SPJ,” the WAVR-21’s acceptance and use continue to grow.

The content of the WAVR-21 includes the manual and the three forms described here. 

Please note: The WAVR manual includes detailed information on the instrument: its foundation as an SPJ, the evidence-based factors, how to use the instrument, user qualifications, interviewing strategies, and case examples.

• Third Edition Manual
  Published in 2016, the V3 manual was extensively revised and updated from the V2 edition. Most significantly, the WAVR has been expanded to encompass the risk assessment issues at institutions of higher education. As an educational resource, the manual is highly valuable to users at all levels of competency.

• Intake and Documentation Questionnaire
  This comprehensive form provides a format for threat assessment investigations. Section A: Incident Report Summary includes red flag indicators useful for triage. Section B: Identifying Information is for collecting employment or school status, demographic, relationships, and historical information on an individual of concern.  Section C: Description of Incident, Reason for Concern Now, and Contextual Information includes queries that address all the risk-relevant factors on the V3 Worksheet.Note that there is no coding on this form. The advantage is that users who are not designated as threat assessors or Worksheet coders can still have a tool for collecting pertinent risk and case-relevant information.

• Worksheet
  The V3 Worksheet and its item coding scheme include more specific workplace and campus-related criteria. It is intended for use by all designated practitioners in an organization’s threat assessment roles, regardless of discipline, with the following caveats: 1.) that users remain within the boundaries of their experience and training; and 2.) have sufficient supervision and consulting relationships with threat assessment expert resources.The item coding categories are absent, present, and prominent. At times there is insufficient information for an item, especially at the beginning of an investigation, which should be noted on the Worksheet or Grid. It is important to remember that insufficient information is not the same as having investigated a factor, especially a highly relevant factor in a given case, adequately enough so that an assessor can reliably state that a risk factor is absent. For example, can it be reliably concluded that an individual of concern who was experiencing violent delusions, and was subsequently treated with antipsychotic medications, is no longer experiencing these symptoms, or is this information just hearsay? A factor or item can also be coded for recent change in either an escalating or de-escalating direction, consistent with the dynamic nature of targeted violence risk. Items that assessors determine are most relevant or critical to investigate further in any ongoing matter can be marked as such, the WAVR serving as a “map” going forward. 

• Grid
  The V3 Grid is a one-page summary of the Worksheet, consisting of the titles of the 21 WAVR factors, item coding, and change columns.

Helpful information on using the forms, pertinent data sources, investigation and interview strategies, and documentation considerations is available in the Basic Procedures section at the beginning of chapter 4 in the WAVR-21 V3 manual.

Recommendations and Precautions for Users

• Be specific about authorizing the use of the WAVR.  Employers and administrators should remain keenly aware of who in their organization is authorized to use and have access to these materials, as well as the sensitive case information they generate.
• Threat assessment teams need adequate training and continuing education. Training in using the WAVR-21 to assess and manage violence risk is highly recommended; in fact, it is essential for most users. Team members need to acquire and demonstrate common knowledge of modes of violence, targeted violence risk and protective factors, and case dynamics and response strategies in organizational contexts. The author-developers of the WAVR-21 and their designated representatives offer several formats: a two-day in-person intensive training available to individual organizations, periodic public workshops that individual users and teams may attend, and virtual and on-demand training of varying lengths. More information about these options may be found on wavr21.com. 
• Get experts on board. All threat assessment teams functioning in organizational contexts should establish relationships with an assessment expert (or experts) with whom the team may consult at any time, but especially for more complex or apparently serious risk scenarios. Senior management stakeholders often need to understand the importance of maintaining such resources. 
• Wise users know their limits and are collaborative. Users should remain mindful that their level of experience and training is sufficient for the threat management duties they are expected to undertake. Peer support within an organization’s team benefits those with less experience. As threat assessment teams are by necessity multi-disciplinary, their members contribute the perspective of their individual disciplines and duties to the task of threat case management. Prudent practitioners will acknowledge that gaining sufficient competence in conducting threat assessments takes time and requires practice. New learning is always in front of us. A universal standard for clinicians and non-clinicians alike is to seek consultation when faced with risk of harm issues beyond their level of experience and training: When in doubt, confer.
• Threat assessment or “protective investigations” are not the same as misconduct or criminal investigations. Threat assessment practice entails some critical differences from routine investigative protocols and dynamics. The goal is to prevent violence, often in the context of associated unresolved personal or organizational conflicts. Safety comes first when considering disciplinary actions. In line with this operational principle, our intent with the WAVR-21 is to present and explain violence risk, threat assessment criteria, and response do’s and don’ts in a style as free as possible from unnecessary jargon. Any clinical or diagnostic terms are explained, and examples are offered.  Many “incidents of concern” can fairly readily be identified as not presenting a potentially serious risk of harm. Other cases are often identifiable early on as potentially posing a very serious risk. However, there are no clear lines between “risk vs no-risk.” The risk for targeted violence is dynamic – it can change in various ways. Professional or clinical judgment will always be required. 

Common Questions and Issues

• What is the distinction between screening for risk and conducting a violence risk assessment? Screening or triage is the determination, based on a review of initially available information, of whether or not a particular individual or scenario generates a concern for violence, and therefore should be treated under an organization’s threat management protocol. The presence or not of key indicators associated with risk will serve as guides for those conducting screening. In Section A (Incident Report Summary) of the WAVR-21 V3’s Intake and Documentation Questionnaire, five such indicators are listed:

• Threats or expressed ideas to harm self or others 
• Behaviors that cause concern for violence to self or others
• Subject has access to weapons or is attempting to gain access
• Bizarre thinking, irrational suspiciousness unsupported by facts
• Circumstances/anticipated events that might affect the likelihood of violence

  Screeners using the form then assign a priority level to the scenario:

  Priority Level: ___Low   ___ Moderate   ___High   ___Urgent

  Priority level and level of concern are related but may differ depending on the facts of the scenario. A situation objectively screened as a low level of concern may still be a high priority; for example, because those who witnessed disruptive behavior are very afraid of what might occur.

Threat assessment and management is formally defined as the investigative and analytical process followed by threat assessment professionals—qualified by education, training, or experience—to determine the nature and level of violence risk presented by an individual or a scenario, and viable actions that could be taken to respond to and mitigate any possible risk of harm. 

• What qualifies an individual to conduct assessments? Further, what standard or criteria will an organization and its threat assessment team establish for conducting its own internal assessments, instead of hiring recognized external assessment experts? This is an important decision for organizations to recognize and to make. New and inexperienced teams should regularly turn to experts. Learning from their retained expert consultants will gradually increase a team’s collective competence. Teams with increasing experience may assess and manage scenarios more frequently without expert help.  Even experienced teams may engage their designated experts for a second opinion to check their own work, or to have the expert conduct, when appropriate, a formal direct assessment of the individual of concern –- typically an employee or student. In general, it is advisable for teams to turn to mental health threat assessment experts when certain risk factors are apparent. These include serious mood disorders, paranoid perceptions, acute states of mental illness, and entrenched negative personality traits (e.g., extreme rigidity and defensiveness, a striking sense of entitlement, disruptive and uncontrollable anger). 

• Who and how many team members should do the documenting of case data? This is a matter to be decided by individual teams. For due diligence, at least one member should be responsible for collating and documenting the team’s (and organization’s) assessments and actions, and the accompanying rationale for how it responded to and managed any case. It is advantageous for team members from different disciplines to enter information, especially actions, related to their specialty. For example, a security manager may enter the specifics of a protection plan enacted for a certain case or his or her communications with law enforcement. An attorney may enter the legal issues that were identified and addressed, or legal actions taken. A licensed mental health professional may document symptoms or behaviors considered indicative of risk in a given case. A risk assessment expert may document his or her opinion of the implications of a subject’s delusions.  All case entries should include who made the entry, the time of the entry, and the source of the data.

• To what degree should investigators pursue information, and how much should they document? This is a question of case management judgment. The answer is often, “it depends.” Sufficiently broad sources of collateral information, where possible and appropriate, are essential to conducting reliable violence risk and threat assessments. Corroboration of observations strengthens hypotheses about the level of concern a case may pose, and further informs intervention decisions.  One guideline to consider is the readiness and availability of risk-relevant information.  If a coworker reports that another employee uttered a threat, the informant is presumably easily available to be interviewed in most circumstances. If a former student is sending voluminous psychotic emails to members of a campus, and he is only known to “live in some foreign country,” inquiries, as well as remedies, will be limited.  If someone is actively stalking a target, it is prudent to conduct a thorough background check for any criminal and civil records. A team must be prepared to defend its decision-making and actions, which are validated by the thoroughness and quality of its database and the members’ professional judgments. These issues are discussed more thoroughly in the WAVR manual as well as other sources. 

Guidelines for Professional Risk Assessors 

Although threat assessment teams in corporate and campus settings are typically composed of professionals from a variety of disciplines, outside professionals who conduct threat assessments for employers and other entities will also find the WAVR-21 V3 extremely helpful.  The WAVR-21 is among the growing number of structured professional judgment instruments, yet is specific to the context of work and higher education settings. Clinical or forensic experts in violence risk assessment, often licensed psychologists, psychiatrists, or social workers, can assist organizations as consultants by conducting either indirect or direct (face-to-face or video conferencing) evaluations of individuals of concern. Clinicians may also function as expert witnesses where the assessment of violence risk is pertinent to civil or criminal proceedings. These professionals are held to a high standard of practice by the court—usually determined by their education, training, and experience–and will readily recognize and benefit from the rationale and evidence-based structure of the WAVR-21. As the research base for the WAVR-21 grows, the instrument will also gain acceptance in both civil and judicial settings as an important organizing tool for professional threat assessors. 

Professional threat assessment experts are best to keep these points in mind:

• Some cases will require a comprehensive clinical and forensic violence risk evaluation which cannot be properly undertaken by an internal threat assessment team
• Many cases do not need such an evaluation and can be efficiently and effectively triaged, assessed, and managed by the internal threat assessment team, who turn to expert guidance when prudent
• The role of the expert is not only to assess, but to educate, and often to function as an ad hoc collaborative team member, offering recommendations that are viable, safe, and wise 
• The nature of an organization’s business as well as its culture define to some degree its risk landscape, what scenarios of concern are more likely to be reported, and how a wide range of incidents may be perceived, minimized, or exaggerated.  
• Threat assessment and threat management are dynamically related. An opinion of risk is not a “one and done” exercise: each threat assessment update informs threat management decision-making. Each attempt to manage an individual or influence a scenario will typically lead to new data, informing and perhaps changing the ongoing assessment of level of concern for risk
• The focus of assessment is not to predict the future, but to help teams identify and manage evidence-based or critical behaviors of concern in the present. Prevention does not require individual prediction
• Meeting personally with and getting to know the organizational team members with whom the expert regularly consults is highly recommended.

How the WAVR-21 Can Help Protect an Organization from Liability 

The number one legal exposure for employers and institutions of higher learning is claims of negligence. The General Duty Clause of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 states that employers must maintain a workplace “free from recognizable hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious harm to employees.” State laws impose similar requirements. Not properly managing and responding to violence risk in work and organizational settings invites lawsuits, an increasing trend. In one recent civil case in California, a school district was found liable for $3.8 million for the failure of their threat assessment team to effectively manage the risk of a student who eventually carried out a school shooting (Cleveland v. Taft Union). If there is a violent outcome, the leaders of the organization will be asked – what did you know, when did you know it, and what did you do about it? Did you follow what are increasingly recognized as best practices in work and school settings? Threat assessment protocols recognize that evidence-based “behaviors of concern” can be identified “upstream,” investigated as to the degree of their possible seriousness, and individually managed, appropriate to each situation and context. Liability for negligence has always been an issue in workplace and campus violence, but the increase in recent years in mass attacks has led to more aggressive enforcement by federal and state regulators, and it is fair to say that this trend will continue. Organizations and their managers will be increasingly obligated to take notice of what is happening in the workplace or on campus, and take prudent steps to provide a safe work or learning environment. 

At the same time, organizations must be sensitive to the rights of employees or students who are the subject of investigations.  For example, shortfalls in the investigative and case management process can generate claims that include discrimination, wrongful termination, invasion of privacy, defamation, and violation of rights under applicable collective bargaining agreements. The Americans with Disabilities Act (1970) and corresponding state laws add further complexity. In general, the ADA should not prevent risk assessments, and does not require an organization to employ someone who poses a “direct threat” to the workplace, as legally defined. Nonetheless, the existence or perception of a known or suspected mental disorder generates for the employer or institution a need to carefully examine potentially complex legal requirements under the ADA, and places a premium on proper communication among team members and their experts, and how information is both documented and stored. 

What is the relevance of the WAVR-21 and other SPJs to these issues? They verify and memorialize that the organization conducts objective and fair threat assessment and management tasks.  If a particular case does eventuate in violence, the organization will be better able to defend itself if it can demonstrate it employed an evidence-based instrument within a broader, best-practice protocol. The use of the WAVR also helps inform decisions about an individual’s employment status and will better protect an organization from claims of discrimination. Threat assessment – and the WAVR – focus on relatively observable and recordable indicators of potential risk: the current thoughts, feelings, communications, and behaviors of an individual of concern suggesting that he or she is on a pathway to intended violence. Mental phenomena that include violent delusions and concerning irrational beliefs, especially persecutory fears of an attack, are indeed within the domain of threat assessment and are part of the WAVR content. However, the WAVR forms and risk factor titles eschew psychiatric diagnoses, using instead, where possible, observable behaviors, statements or communications. 

A criticism sometimes lodged against threat assessment, and thus SPJs like the WAVR, is that practitioners are engaging in demographic profiling and/or presuming to “predict” that an individual will be violent, thus subjecting him or her to potential discriminatory and harmful consequences, formal or otherwise. The defense against this position is that threat assessment seeks to identify evidence-based “behaviors of concern” in the present, and to risk manage them. It is fair to say that this does involve “profiling” of behaviors, as we are undertaking pattern analysis – what is a person thinking, feeling, or doing in real time that suggests he or she may choose violence (of what nature and severity, to whom and in what time frame) as a justified action in their mind to resolve some real or felt life crisis or unbearable experience. Threat assessment inquiries in organizational contexts have more often led to conclusions that an individual who has come to attention does not pose a risk of harm, thus removing that cloud over their head, whatever else may be at issue.   

The days of assuming that targeted violence “can’t happen here” are over.  The days of believing that, “If we don’t write it down, we won’t be held liable for our actions” (or inactions), are over.  The days of relying on the personal, subjective opinion of a team leader are over. Dismissing someone from the organization perceived as a threat because they are just “odd” or make “bizarre” statements creates legal and ethical issues for management. The potential for civil litigation against threat assessment teams is here to stay and is growing. A best defense – best practice – comprehensive strategy should include an objective, evidence-based instrument for determining level of concern for harm, used by adequately trained and competent practitioners.  This in turn promotes a more rational formulation of actions to consider for mitigating risk, while objectively evaluating and fairly treating all individuals who may come to the attention of an organization’s risk management resources.